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Squibs and Discussions 
Do the Right Thing ... but Expect the 
Unexpected 
Jon Ober lander"  
University of Edinburgh 
1. Do the Right Thing 
Dale and Reiter (1995) have recently discussed the nature of referring expression gen- 
eration, focusing on the case of definite noun phrases. In particular, they consider 
Gricean approaches, whereby the speaker is supposed to take into account likely in- 
ferences by the hearer, in accord with Gricean maxims (Grice 1989), and select the 
generated NP accordingly, so as to avoid false or misleading inferences (Joshi 1982). 
They observe that previous accounts (including their own) have attempted tooptimiz e
the generated noun phrase, making it as brief as possible, within the constraints of 
accurately distinguishing the intended referent from any other candidate referents. For 
instance, consider a situation containing three animals: one small white cat and two 
dogs, one large and black and the other small and white. It is usually assumed that 
an optimal description of the first dog is either the large dog or the black dog, whereas 
the large black dog will be suboptimal, since it contains two adjectives where one will 
do; it is longer than strictly necessary, and suffers from a degree of redundancy (Dale 
1992; Reiter 1990). 
However, Dale and Reiter argue that the previous algorithms proposed for this 
task are computationally inefficient, and that the task itself must be reconsidered. In
particular, they suggest that there is substantial psycholinguistic evidence that people 
don't generate the shortest, most efficient NPs, and that this behavior is regarded as 
perfectly natural (see Levelt [1989] for a survey). Hence, generation algorithms need 
not optimize their descriptions either. 
Dale and Reiter go further; they state that: 
One could even argue that an algorithm based on psycholinguistic observations 
of human speakers may in fact be superior to one that attempts to interpret the 
maxims as strictly as (computationally) possible. This would be justified if one 
believed that the Gricean maxims were simply an approximation tothe general 
principle of "if a speaker utters an unexpected utterance, the hearer may try to 
infer a reason for the speaker's failure to use the expected utterance"; under this 
perspective, a system that imitated human behaviour would be more likely to 
generate ' xpected' utterances than a system that simply tried to obey general 
principles uch as brevity, relevance, and so on. (p. 253) 
The primary point is that the behavior of human speakers involves the production 
of nonrninimal utterances, and their hearers expect his behavior. Conversely, hearers 
do not expect speakers to produce optimal, minimized utterances; uch an unexpected 
utterance would in fact provoke its hearer to search for reasons for its speaker's failure 
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to use an expected utterance. Both people and natural anguage generation systems 
should therefore strive to produce the most expected utterance, if they are to avoid 
unwanted implicatures. It has been suggested that this position can be encapsulated 
in a new high-level maxim: 
Spike Lee's Maxim 
Do the right filing. 1 
Gricean maxims have been discussed in considerable detail; by analogy, we can scru- 
tinize the ideas underlying this "Spikean maxim," and the injunction to "do the right 
thing." The key question is whether we can make consistent sense of the notion of a 
generator attempting to generate an "expected" utterance. 
2. What's Right? 
So, let us equate generating expected utterances with doing the right thing; the failure 
to generate them counts as "doing the wrong thing," and leads to additional process- 
ing effort on the part of the hearer. But what is the "right" thing? What counts as 
"expected"? Given Dale and Reiter's evidence, we can immediately concede that the 
shortest, most efficient description eed not be the most expected, and hence is not 
always the right thing. But is there any way of spelling out the injunction in more 
detail? 
In fact, there are two ways of adding detail and both seem to be intended by Dale 
and Reiter; we may thus consider them Spikean submaxims: 
. 
2. 
Do the human thing. 
Do the simple thing. 
The first of these trades on the obvious fact that human language users are sensitive to 
the conventional behavior of other human language users. We learn those conventions 
and, by generating in accord with them, produce the kinds of utterance expected under 
the circumstances. We thereby maximize our chances of being understood. So, at an 
engineering level, the best thing for natural language ngineers to do is to build 
systems that emulate human behavior as faithfully as possible. 
The second submaxim is slightly less obvious, but should come as a relief for the 
engineers. The right thing might after all be characterized asthe simplest output--so 
long as the simplicity lies in the algorithm that produced it, instead of in the relative 
complexity of the output string itself. The nature of the algorithm is an empirical 
matter, and a good way of uncovering it is, of course, through observing human 
behavior. 
Indeed, according to Dale and Reiter, the psycholinguistic evidence on definite 
noun phrases is that doing the human thing and doing the simple thing go hand 
1 The suggested formulation is Robert Frederking's, and it was proposed at the 1996 AAAI Spring 
Symposium on Computational Implicature, chaired by Barbara Di Eugenio and Nancy Green. The 
name of the maxim was settled by popular consensus, and is a reference to Spike Lee's 1989 film Do the 
Right Thing. As we shall see, this maxim mainly provides a convenient label, bringing together the 
more detailed aims made by Dale and Reiter. 
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in hand; people use a simple algorithm, which doesn't waste excessive resources on 
computing possible misinterpretations: 
The principle that has emerged from our study of the referring expression 
generation task is that a simple and nonliteral interpretation f the Gricean 
maxims is to be preferred... Perhaps it may some day be possible to make a 
very general statement such as "human speakers in general use very simple (in 
computational terms) interpretations ofthe maxims of conversational 
implicature, and hence computer natural language generation systems should 
also use such interpretations." (p. 262) 
It is easy to see how one might be tempted to assume that the human thing is the 
simple thing, and that this grounds out the notion of an expected utterance. For one 
thing, if speakers follow simple algorithms, then since most hearers are themselves 
speakers, they could conceivably predict speakers' behavior by unconsciously antic- 
ipating what they themselves would do. But of course, this only stays simple--and 
avoids infinite recursion--so l ng as the predicted speaker behavior doesn't involve 
consultation of a sophisticated model of the hearer. However, a more convincing rea- 
son might lie in the conventional behavior of language communities. In a community 
of language users, if speakers follow simple algorithms, then simply generated ut- 
terances will provide the corpus of observed human language use from which any 
conventions will arise, and from there guide future behavior. The simple algorithm 
for referring expressions could involve run-time computation of the set of predicates 
to use, or it could involve selection from precompiled items in a phrasal exicon; but 
either wan behavior in accord with the simple algorithm becomes what is expected 
by other speakers. 
To summarize this position: human speakers can do the right thing, and hence 
observe the Spikean maxim, by following simple algorithms. Emulating human gen- 
eration behavior, via the use of a simple, empirically discovered algorithm, delivers a 
system that generates the expected utterances. 
3. What's Wrong with This? 
Unfortunately, this position might be plausible in the case of definite noun phrase 
generation, but it cannot be correct in general. The difficulties hinge on the notion 
of expectation. Dale and Reiter's argument relies on psycholinguistic findings on the 
generation of definites to help reveal what people regard as expected or unexpected. 
But there are other empirical results, concerning the generation and interpretation f
pronouns, which do not fit into this picture. 
A good deal of work has been carried out on human behavior with respect o 
the processing of pronominal expressions. In particular, one strand of research as 
examined the psychological plausibility of Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein's (1983, 1995) 
Centering Theory. Hudson D'Zmura (1988), for instance, is one of several researchers 
to have shown that pronouns in subject position that specify the highest-ranked Cf
(forward-looking center) of the preceding utterance are interpreted more rapidly than 
repeated names in subject position. This is attributed to an expectancy effect because 
the subject position is the preferred site of the Cb (backward-looking center), which is 
normally a pronoun specifying the highest ranked Cf. A related strand of research, by 
Stevenson and her collaborators (Stevenson, Crawle~ and Kleinman 1994; Stevenson 
and Urbanowicz 1995), connects this work on centering to other possible influences 
on processing, including preferences concerning thematic roles (Dowty 1991), and the 
effects of connective xpressions in multiclause sentences. 
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Stevenson and her collaborators have pursued two main types of empirical study: 
continuation tasks~ and reading time tasks. In continuation tasks, a subject is typically 
presented with a sentence or sentence fragment, and asked to continue it. When the 
fragment contains two sentences (or clauses), the first mentioning two entities, and 
the second either empty, or containing merely an initial pronoun, the completions can 
be categorized on the basis of which entity functions as antecedent, and the results 
analyzed to reveal preferences for particular patterns of anaphoric reference. In reading 
time studies, a subject is presented with a complex sentence, or pair of sentences, and 
the time they take to read it is measured and analyzed. 
Both types of study are highly relevant o the current issue. Continuation studies 
examine the kinds of (written) utterances that people prefer to generate in given, 
carefully controlled contexts. Reading time studies examine the relative ease with 
which people interpret he (written) utterances they are presented with in carefully 
controlled contexts. So, on the one side, we would predict hat continuation preferences 
will reveal the output that speakers are most likely to generate in a given context; on 
the other side, we would predict that reading times will reveal which inputs hearers 
expect most strongly in a given context. It is worth reiterating the latter point: a good 
guide as to whether an utterance is expected or not is the amount of processing it 
gives rise to; certainly, Dale and Reiter are not alone in assuming that an unexpected 
utterance will give rise to additional inferences on the part of its hearer. In the case of 
written text, the amount of processing is operationally detected by measuring reading 
times: unexpected sentence fragments in a given context will take longer to read than 
expected fragments in the same context. 
Now, Stevenson's own hypothesis i that preferences due to centering constraints 
interact with those due to the thematic roles of the entities referred to. On this view, 
centering primarily influences how an entity introduced in one sentence will be re- 
ferred to in the next (by pronoun, or by name, for instance); thematic roles influence 
which entities will be subsequently referred to (the Agent, or the Patient, from the 
first sentence, for instance). In particular, centering tells us to expect a pronoun in 
subject position to specify the highest ranked Cf from the previous sentence. On the 
other hand, thematic role information tells us to expect hat the subject of the current 
sentence is more likely to specify an entity associated with the consequences of the 
event introduced in the previous sentence; thus, if the verb in the previous sentence 
introduced roles for Goal and Source, then the subject of the current sentence is most 
likely to be the Goal from the previous entence. 
To illustrate, analysis of continuation data confirms that people prefer to use a 
pronoun to refer to the entity in initial position and to use a repeated name for the 
entity in second position. This effect is independent of who gets referred to, which 
depends on the thematic role of each referent. Compare examples (1) and (2): 
(1) 
(2) 
John gave the book to Bill and ... 
Bill took the book from John and ... 
People continue the fragment with a pronoun when they want to refer to John in (1) 
and Bill in (2), but they are more likely to repeat he name when they want to refer to 
Bill in (1) and John in (2). This is despite the fact that in both sentences Bill (the Goal) 
is the person they are most likely to refer to. 
Now, there are some very interesting apparent discrepancies between certain re- 
sults from the continuation studies and the reading time studies. Take an example of 
the form in (3). Look at four variants, all using the connective so: 
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(3) a. John gave the book to Bill so he ... [he = John] 
b. John gave the book to Bill so John ... 
c. John gave the book to Bill so he ... [he = Bill] 
d. John gave the book to Bill so Bill ... 
First, consider the results of continuation studies for such examples; the evidence here 
is from Stevenson, Crawley and Kleinman's (1994) third experiment, he results of 
which confirm the findings from two other continuation experiments reported there. 
The materials contained three initial fragment types: goal-source; xperiencer-stimulus; 
and agent-patient. Each fragment ended in a connective. The design manipulated two 
factors: order of thematic roles in the initial fragment (for instance, source-goaL as in 
(3a), or goal-source); and connective (so versus because). 
It was found that, if a person generated the pronoun he as the first word in their 
continuation, it was almost always used to refer to John (pp. 537-39). It seems that the 
effects of centering swamp the effects of thematic role--the generator here prefers to 
write about John. Thus, (a)-type continuations would be preferred to (c)-type contin- 
uations. 
Now, compare the results of reading time studies for such examples; the evidence 
here is from Stevenson and Urbanowicz (1995). The materials consisted of two-clause 
sentences, uch as (4): 
(4) Malcolm won some money from Stuart because he was very good at 
poker. 
Each sentence was presented a clause at a time, followed by a comprehension ques- 
tion, which probed the correct resolution of any anaphor that appeared. The design 
manipulated four factors: type of anaphor in second clause (pronoun, such as he, ver- 
sus repeated name, such as Malcolm); order of thematic roles in the initial fragment 
(source-goal versus goal-source); connective (so versus because); and antecedent (Goal 
or Source). 
It was found that, when encountered, (c)-type sentences were read significantly 
faster than (a)-type sentences (p. 331). That is, with so and he, complex sentences where 
the antecedent is the Goal-in-second-position prove faster to read than those in which 
the antecedent is Source-in-initial-position. It seems that effects of thematic role win 
out--the interpreter expects to read about Bill. 
Bringing the results of these studies together, there is an apparent asymmetry 
between interpretive and generative behavior. At a thematic level, both generators 
and interpreters prefer to talk about goals, and so (c)-type and (d)-type sentences 
are most likely to be generated, and are most expected by interpreters. However, at 
the syntactic realization level, generators will only rarely produce (c)-type utterances. 
Given a fragment ending with so, a generator that next outputs he will usually go 
on to produce an (a)-type sentence. Yet, given that reading time is an indication of 
expectedness, it seems that, on the contrar~ (c)-type sentences are more expected, and 
easier to process, than (a)-types. 
To put it another way, given a certain type of prior context, generators will sys- 
tematically fail to produce the utterance that is easiest o process. And to put it yet 
another way, this is evidence against the hypothesis that people do the right thing, in 
the sense of generating the most expected utterance. 
In fact, this body of evidence simultaneously undermines the idea that the out- 
put of a simple, highly plausible algorithm will be what is most expected, and the 
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idea that the emulation of human behavior will invariably produce the most expected 
utterances. The first idea falls because a simple centering-based generator would in- 
variably generate (a)-type continuations--and these are less expected than (c)-type 
continuations. Now, it could be suggested that we replace the simple centering al- 
gorithm with one that also includes thematic role preferences. Unfortunately, even if 
this algorithm correctly emulates human behavior, it will still generate (a)-type con- 
tinuations in preference to (c)-types--because that is what people do, too. And for 
this reason, the second idea also falls: emulating human behavior here cannot hope to 
produce the most expected utterances, for the good reason that people don't produce 
the most expected utterances in the first place. 
To summarize this argument: if you emulate human behavior, you must--as a 
matter of course--expect to generate unexpected utterances. Thus, if doing the right 
thing is doing the simple thing, or even just doing the human thing, it is here doomed 
to fail to generate the expected utterance. 
4. Expect the Unexpected 
Now, how serious is this problem for Dale and Reiter? If a psycholinguistically inspired 
algorithm for pronoun generation leads us to expect unexpected output, should we 
conclude that doing the right thing--the human thing, the simple thing--will always 
get the wrong results? 
Obviously not. Dale and Reiter's algorithm was for generating definite noun 
phrases, not pronouns. It might be thought that by comparing continuation and 
reading time studies on definites, we could undermine their position more directly. 
However, there is a sense in which this would be immaterial; their algorithm clearly 
achieves reasonable output much of the time. Thus, it is tempting to conclude that 
Spike Lee's maxim simply has limited applicability: people (and machines) should do 
the right thing, but only on some---not all--generation tasks. 
However, this does not seem quite right, either. Rather, the key lesson from the 
work on pronoun generation and interpretation is that we must develop amore sophis- 
ticated view of "expectation." In all the examples like (3), Bill is the person a generator 
is expected to talk about--and for whom a pronoun would thus make good sense-- 
but this thematically based expectation must be played off against he centering-based 
expectation; there are multiple factors underlying any expectation. The existence of 
such multiple factors is the fundamental reason why speakers can always be put into 
a context in which they will generate utterances they themselves find relatively hard 
to interpret. The existence of multiple factors also carries a more general lesson for 
computational linguists. If we hope to trade in psycholinguistic findings for new al- 
gorithms, we must resist the temptation to be overly selective concerning the results 
we pick on.  2 
Thus, Dale and Reiter could be strategically correct: careful study of human gen- 
erative behavior may well reveal that it is less complex than we have come to believe, 
and that emulating this simple behavior is the right policy in general. Doing the right 
thing, emulating human performance is generally better than slavishly following literal 
interpretations of the maxims. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that, because there are multiple factors underlying 
any expectation, a human-inspired algorithm for generating the expected utterance 
can in fact produce unexpected utterances. However simple or complex the algorithm 
2 This paper has itself obviously been selective; but it is not intended to be perniciously so. 
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for choosing what to talk about next, and how to refer to it, people will still say things 
they would find surprising. Human performance thus embraces a mild paradox, which 
means that even the best emulator will always generate unexpected utterances, which 
violate Spike Lee's maxim, and cause unwanted implicatures. 
Some would argue that the semblance of paradox is simply evidence that there 
are limits to the experimental paradigm. That there are such limits is not in doubt. 
But there remains omething odd about the fact that not only would I myself gener- 
ate the unexpected utterance, but everyone lse would too. Thus, over time, I really 
should come to expect his unexpected utterance---and it should therefore stop being 
unexpected. Perhaps I am exposed to too few instances of the paradoxical behavior 
in my lifetime to become attuned to it, but the language community as a whole has 
already had plenty of time to adjust its expectations. It has not done so: the asymmetry 
in behavior appears to be stable. Thus, individual language users will continue to be 
surprised by the behavior of their language community. By contrast, researchers in
natural language generation should not be surprised at such asymmetries in behavior. 
Once we understand better both the behavior, and the interplay of expectations which 
underlies it, analysts and engineers alike will know exactly when they should expect 
the unexpected. 
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